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Questioning Thomas Pogge’s Proposals to Eradicate
Global Poverty
EDUARD JORDAAN
Moral cosmopolitanism has often been criticised for being too demanding and not offer-
ing a viable solution to the problem of extreme global poverty. Thomas Pogge has
responded to both these concerns by arguing that it is possible to eradicate most global
poverty through relatively light international-level actions. Pogge’s proposals can be
divided into two broad categories: financial transfers to the poor and international insti-
tutional reforms (which include changing the rules of global trade and restricting the
ability of undemocratic governments to borrow internationally or sell off their country’s
natural resources). However, Pogge’s proposed international-level actions are unlikely to
eradicate global poverty as he has underestimated the tenacity of poverty-causing local
practices. More specifically, this article will question the workability of Pogge’s plans
against the backdrop of sub-Saharan Africa. Confronted with a gap between what
Pogge’s proposed international-level reforms are able to accomplish and what they aim
to accomplish, the final part of the paper considers Pogge’s three options (or some
combination of them): one, settle for a more modest reduction of global poverty; two,
expect greater endeavour from the poor and their governments; or (and) three,
demand a deeper involvement and sacrifice from citizens of well-off countries.
Introduction
In 1972, Peter Singer published “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, a short article
that continues to preoccupy philosophical reflection about global distributive
justice.1 Singer argued that in order to save as many people as possible from
life-threatening poverty we should contribute to relief agencies up to the level
of marginal utility, that is, “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as
much suffering to myself or my dependents [sic] as I would relieve by my gift”.2
Moral cosmopolitanism has often been rejected for proposing solutions to the
problem of global poverty that are not viable or that are too demanding. Singer is
guilty on both counts. It is doubtful whether his solution of giving money to aid
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their extensive and very helpful
comments.
1. For example, Gareth Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004); Andrew Kuper, “More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the ‘Singer Solution’”,
Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), pp. 107–120.
2. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, in C. Beitz et al. (eds.), International Ethics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 259.
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agencies can solve the problem of the roughly 1.4 billion people living in extreme
poverty.3 Further, as Singer admits, giving up to the level of marginal utility
would result in our reducing ourselves “to very near the material circumstances
of a Bengali refugee”.4 Fishkin, in a book-length study of Singer’s article, suggests
a more viable solution, namely that large-scale public problems might be better
solved by collectivities, states and other large institutions.5
The idea that our efforts to solve global poverty should focus on the most
significant international institutions is a hallmark of Thomas Pogge’s cosmopoli-
tanism. Pogge has been at pains to address concerns about the demandingness
and workability that cast a shadow over cosmopolitan proposals to end global
poverty. He tries to calm fears about the demandingness of his proposals when
he writes that “[f]or the first time in human history it is quite feasible, economi-
cally, to wipe out hunger and preventable diseases worldwide without real incon-
venience to anyone”.6 Pogge’s proposals appear more workable because they rely
on institutional solutions, rather than less effective and harder to sustain interper-
sonal efforts, and because they profess to be able to induce an end to severe global
poverty through international-level actions alone, thus negating any reliance on
incompetent and corrupt governments in poor countries. Pogge is not blind to
the fact that much poverty is caused by local actions, specifically by ruinous gov-
ernance, and acknowledges that “most severe poverty would be avoided . . . if the
national governments and elites of the poor countries were genuinely committed
to ‘good governance’ and poverty eradication”.7 However, and this is the strategy
that Pogge chooses, he also maintains “that most severe poverty would be
avoided, despite the corrupt and oppressive regimes holding sway in so many
poor countries, if the global institutional order were designed to achieve this
purpose”.8
Unfortunately, Pogge seems to have overestimated the impact of his inter-
national-level initiatives on global poverty and frequently also the ease with
which these proposals can be implemented. The principal problem is that many
national institutional environments, through which international-level reforms
would have to pass, are so toxic that they are likely to defeat Pogge’s proposed
3. According to the World Bank’s adjusted measure of extreme poverty, $1.25 a day; World Bank,
Poverty Data: A Supplement to World Bank Development Indicators 2008, available: ,http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI08supplement1216.pdf. (accessed
20 November 2009).
4. Singer, op. cit., p. 241. More recently, Singer has argued that if an American family needs roughly
$30,000 to pay for necessities, a family with an income of $50,000 should give away as close to $20 000 as
possible; Peter Singer, “The Singer Solution to World Poverty”, New York Times Magazine (5 September
1999), pp. 60–63. Even with its restated figures, Singer’s position remains too demanding for most. As
Cullity has argued, we should help the poor to lead longer and healthier lives, but also to lead more
fulfilling lives. This might include giving a poor student a scholarship to study music. But, as music
is not a necessity, we would be helping a poor person to get what it is wrong to have, which can’t
be right. If it is permitted to spend money on the “unnecessary” pursuits of the poor, then it should
also be permitted for the better-off; Cullity, op. cit., pp. 135–137.
5. James Fishkin, The Limits of Obligation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 9.
6. Thomas Pogge, “Priorities of Global Justice”, in T.W. Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford: Black-
well, 2001), p. 13.
7. Thomas Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation”, in T.W. Pogge (ed.), Freedom from
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
p. 46.
8. Ibid.
232 Eduard Jordaan
international initiatives. Faced with a gap between the limited effect of his pro-
posed reforms and his desire to see an end to global poverty, Pogge is left with
three options, or some combination thereof, that seem representative of those
that confront cosmopolitan approaches to justice more generally: one, settle for
a more modest reduction of global poverty; two, expect greater endeavour from
the poor and their governments in lifting themselves out of poverty; and/or
three, demand deeper involvement and sacrifice on our part in eradicating
global poverty.
Pogge is one of the most important cosmopolitan theorists writing today and his
work has consequently received a good deal of critical attention. Most of Pogge’s
commentators make mention of the place of negative duties in his approach.
Pogge argues that we have a negative duty not to harm the global poor, as we
are currently guilty of doing. Further, Pogge tries hard to steer clear of claiming
that we have positive duties to the world’s poor, as they are less readily accepted
than negative duties. There is a widely shared view among Pogge’s critics that he
includes so much in the performance of a negative duty to the poor that it begins
to look like a positive duty. In Gilabert’s assessment, “harming someone becomes
equivalent to failing to improve her condition as much as possible”.9 By empha-
sising negative duties Pogge creates the impression that his cosmopolitanism is
not very demanding, as negative duties merely involve refraining from doing
something. I do not address the debate over Pogge’s use of negative duties, but
my argument shares the sense that Pogge is trying to get too much for too little
by claiming that most severe poverty can be solved through international-level
initiatives. Others have questioned Pogge’s focus on the international causes of
poverty, notably Debra Satz.10 I share these concerns, yet place more emphasis
on the intransigence of local poverty in the face of international efforts, specifically
those proposed by Pogge.
The rest of this article consists of five sections. The first section gives a brief
overview of the relevant parts of Pogge’s cosmopolitanism. As it will be argued
that Pogge has underestimated the poverty-causing consequences of local
factors and overestimated the ability of international-level initiatives to overcome
these factors, some sense of the national environment in poor countries is needed.
This is provided in the second section through reference to the world’s poorest
and worst-governed region, namely sub-Saharan Africa. The third section con-
siders the first broad way in which Pogge claims we should compensate the
global poor for the harm we inflict on them, financial transfers, while the fourth
section considers the second category of compensating action, namely inter-
national institutional reform. The fifth and concluding section considers Pogge’s
options in so far as the charge that his proposals will not easily lead to the eradica-
tion of poverty, at least not in sub-Saharan Africa, is accepted. It is concluded that
Pogge’s cosmopolitanism needs to acknowledge that effective international-level
reforms will be more demanding and more difficult to achieve than he suggests,
and, more importantly, that mere international-level institutional reform will not
be enough, as global poverty cannot be ended without proper local institutions
and just and responsible national leadership. This article offers mostly an
9. Pablo Gilabert, “The Duty to Eradicate Global Poverty: Positive or Negative?”, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2005), p. 542.
10. Debra Satz, “What Do We Owe the Global Poor?”, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1
(2005), pp. 47–54.
Questioning Pogge’s Proposals to Eradicate Global Poverty 233
empirical assessment of Pogge’s cosmopolitan proposals, which will be unable to
wipe out global poverty. I agree with Pogge’s arguments about what is morally
demanded of us, but worry that these requirements do not demand enough of
us to end global poverty. It is in the fifth section where I become more prescriptive
and arrive at the admittedly bluntly stated conclusion that more should be
demanded of the better-off as well as of the poor and their leaders.
Pogge’s Institutional Cosmopolitanism
As a moral cosmopolitan, Pogge regards individuals as the ultimate units of moral
concern, a regard that they enjoy equally and universally.11 Pogge distinguishes
between “institutional” and “interactional” cosmopolitanism, a distinction that
enables Pogge’s candid and characteristic preference for the institutional
approach. On an interactional approach to cosmopolitan morality,12 primary
responsibility for fulfilling the human rights of others is assigned to individual
and collective agents, whereas an institutional approach, as the name indicates,
assigns primary responsibility for ensuring human rights to institutions.13
Although Pogge sees institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism as poten-
tially supplementary, he leaves the matter of their interrelation unresolved.
According to Pogge, the institutional approach brings the important benefit of pre-
venting those who live in the world’s wealthy democracies from claiming that
they are not morally connected to the poor in less developed countries, because
all of us are “participants in a single, global institutional order”, made up of insti-
tutions such as “the territorial state, a system of international law and diplomacy,
as well as a global economic system of property rights and markets for capital,
goods, and services”.14 Furthermore, the institutional approach to cosmopolitan
justice better reflects the notion that much of the harm we cause the poor is inad-
vertent, a result of the way things are arranged, rather than of deliberately
immoral behaviour by certain actors. In addition, the institutional approach
offers a cheaper and more effective way of responding to global poverty than
the interactional approach—small changes in the rules of the global economic
order can have a huge impact on global poverty—as well as the benefit that
“morally successful rules are so much easier to sustain than morally successful
conduct”.15
In contrast to its interactional variant, institutional cosmopolitanism holds that
responsibility for others is indirect—responsibility is achieved through the justice
of the institutions one supports and participates in. This gives rise to the duty “not
to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably
leaves human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to aid its
11. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2002), p. 169.
12. For example, Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980); Singer, op. cit., pp. 247–261.
13. Pogge understands institutions “as a social system’s practices or ‘rules of the game’, which
govern interactions among individual and collective agents as well as their access to material resources
. . . The totality of the more fundamental and pervasive institutions of a social system has been called its
institutional order or basic structure” (Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 31).
14. Ibid., p. 171.
15. Pogge, “Severe Poverty”, op. cit., p. 26.
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victims and to promote institutional reform”.16 Pogge regards our duty to reform
institutions that violate human rights as a negative duty, a duty not to do some-
thing, in this case, a duty not to harm the global poor by imposing the current
unnecessarily injurious global institutional order upon them. Because Pogge
holds negative duties to be weightier and more defensible than positive duties,
he does not merely want to argue that we are failing to fulfil a duty of mutual
aid (a positive duty), but wants to make the more serious charge that we are actu-
ally causing poverty-related death and suffering through the institutions we
impose (violating a negative duty). In other words, we are not only failing to
save the global poor but are in fact killing them, albeit indirectly.17
Whereas using global institutional interconnectedness to establish a moral link
between the world’s affluent and its poor is straightforward, for our negative duty
not to harm the global poor (and subsequent obligations to fulfil this duty) to be
activated Pogge has to implicate us in imposing a global institutional order that
need not hold such harmful consequences for the poor. Pogge does this by point-
ing, firstly, to the harmful consequences that past and ongoing decisions about the
rules of the global economy hold for the global poor, rules that are typically
decided during rounds of negotiations in which poor countries have negligible
influence;18 secondly, to deeper rules and principles of the global political
economy that do not even appear to be up for negotiation, but that are neverthe-
less amendable, such as granting corrupt and/or oppressive governments the
international recognition that enables them to borrow in the name of their
countries and to sell off its natural resources;19 and thirdly, to a number of see-
mingly straightforward initiatives that would go a considerable way towards
improving the plight of the global poor, such as a fairer international trade agree-
ment, the use of public funds to create stronger incentives for medical researchers
to focus on the medical needs of the global poor, and raising money for poverty
alleviation through an international tax on countries’ pro rata use of natural
resources, etc. Having claimed that a global order more amenable to the interests
of the poor has been and still is within relatively easy reach, Pogge implicates us,
via the governments that we elect, that act in our name and presumably in our
interest, and that predominate during international negotiations about the rules
of global economy, in imposing an unnecessarily harmful global economic order
on the global poor.20
16. Pogge’s conception of human rights contains not only the usual negative liberties such as one’s
freedom of person but also the right to subsistence levels of food, drink, shelter, clothing and basic
health care, as well as the right to basic education and economic participation, Pogge, World Poverty,
op. cit., p. 170.
17. Ibid., pp. 12, 130.
18. Ibid., pp. 20, 199.
19. Ibid., pp. 112–116, 146–167.
20. Ibid., pp. 13, 24. Risse observes that instead of blaming the global economic order for the daily
deaths of approximately 34,000 children of preventable poverty-related causes, we could credit this
order with preventing a higher number of such deaths, since by “any standard development indicator,
the human race has never been better off” than it is today; Mathias Risse, “How Does the Global Order
Harm the Poor?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2005), p. 370. Nevertheless, Pogge’s pro-
posed reforms might be considered so minor that their enactment would not constitute an “overthrow”
of the current global economic order, but a mere adjustment thereof. In other words, since the global
economic order can easily be improved upon in terms of reducing poverty, its recent accomplishments
notwithstanding, it is to be blamed for unnecessarily harming the world’s poorest; Thomas Pogge,
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Neopatrimonial Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa
Since participation in the global institutional order that harms the global poor is
almost impossible to avoid,21 we are required to perform “compensating
action”.22 In Pogge’s writing, compensating action takes place at the international
level and falls into two broad categories: financial transfers to the poor and inter-
national institutional reform. Pogge claims that each of these two types of com-
pensating action would on its own be enough to largely eradicate extreme
global poverty.23 What is more, Pogge claims that each of these two forms of com-
pensating action would require minimal effort and sacrifice on our part, although
he regards institutional reform as the more viable path to pursue.24 The purpose of
this section is to sketch a picture of the adverse institutional environment through
which international efforts to eradicate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa would have
to move and to suggest that the origins of the neopatrimonial state in sub-Saharan
Africa lie in colonialism.
As mentioned, Pogge has been accused of placing too much emphasis on the
international causes of and solutions to poverty.25 To these charges, Pogge replies:
I do not seek “to explain all local failure in terms of failures of the global
order”. No global institutional order, no matter how well designed, could
possibly forestall all local failures. I do hold that most of the severe poverty
today would be avoided if the design of the global order were just. I
concede that most of today’s severe poverty would also be avoided if
the poor countries had just social institutions and policies . . . Satz is
right that there is considerable empirical uncertainty about why exactly
severe poverty persists at such a high global rate. She is right that
“various countries are unlikely to agree as to how much harm is caused
by global as opposed to local institutions”. But I need not achieve agree-
ment on this. I must make plausible that most severe poverty is avoidable
through reforms in the design of the global institutional order and that it is
possible to design specific reforms that would work.26
Pogge has little patience for “explanatory nationalism”, the tendency to confine an
explanation of why some countries are poor to national factors, while overlooking
international causes of their poverty. When Pogge does acknowledge that venal
and unresponsive national leadership should carry some blame for poverty in
many developing countries, he quickly points to factors above the national level
that enable local corruption.27 More importantly, Pogge’s contention that most
global poverty can be solved through international actions alone and with little
inconvenience to us means that he does not think that local practices,
“Reply to the Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties”, Ethics and International Affairs,
Vol. 19, No. 1 (2005), p. 59.
21. Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 276.
22. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 144.
23. Ibid., p. 2; idem, “Reply to the Critics”, op. cit., pp. 75–76.
24. Pogge, “Severe Poverty”, op. cit., p. 28.
25. Satz, op. cit., p. 49.
26. Pogge, “Reply to the Critics”, op. cit., pp. 76–77; emphasis in original.
27. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., pp. 22, 111.
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dysfunctional institutions or unsavoury leaders are fundamental hurdles to such
attempts. To get around governments that obstruct international efforts to reach
the poor, one could, for example, respond by “making cash payments directly
to [the poor] or to their organizations or by funding development programs admi-
nistered through UN agencies or effective non-governmental organizations”.28
Non-governmental organisations and international governmental agencies can
compensate for state failure to some extent. If, however, our goal is long-term
economic development and the eradication of global poverty, then, as van de
Walle puts it, “There is no getting around the fact that the central state is the
key player in low-income economies.”29 At a minimum, it is difficult to imagine
that the basic infrastructure and law and order that are necessary for non-state
development agencies can be provided nationwide by an actor other than the
state.30 Moreover, there is considerable agreement that the institutional quality
of the recipient country is a principal determinant of whether or not development
aid will be effective.31 The implication for Pogge’s argument is clear: international-
level action alone will not eradicate most severe global poverty. However, it is
necessary to paint a picture of the national institutional environments that
would consistently scupper such international attempts, specifically those pro-
posed by Pogge. This will be done with reference to the poorest and worst-
governed region of all, namely sub-Saharan Africa.
Governance in sub-Saharan Africa is marked by a powerful neopatrimonial
logic that continues to undermine developmental efforts. Neopatrimonial prac-
tices are visible in all polities, yet “it is the core feature of politics in Africa”.32
Although the concept of “neopatrimonialism” is not without its shortcomings, it
is used widely by scholars of African political economy to capture the pathological
governance endemic to sub-Saharan Africa.33 Weber described the structure of
authority in small, traditional societies as patrimonial, a system in which power
and prestige are centred in a single person and rules are based not on codified
law but on the ruler’s preferences. The ruler selectively and manipulatively
grants favours to his underlings and provides them with a zone of political stab-
ility and security, although an administration and a military force, in so far as
these exist, are “purely personal instruments of the master”.34 The term neopatri-
monialism is used to single out societies in which the exercise of political authority
tends to be informal, unpredictable and personalised, but, in contrast to
28. Ibid., p. 26.
29. Nicolas van de Walle, Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-dependent Countries (Washington, DC: Center
for Global Development, 2005), p. 36.
30. Ibid.
31. For example, Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (2000), pp. 847–868; Steve Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid, Working Paper No. 92
(Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006), p. 11, available: ,http://www.cgdev.org/
content/publications/detail/8846. (accessed 2 December 2008).
32. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 62.
33. For a critical overview, see Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a
Catch-all Concept, Working Paper No. 16 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2006);
Aaron deGrassi, “‘Neopatrimonialism’ and Agricultural Development in Africa: Contributions and
Limitations of a Contested Concept”, African Studies Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2008), pp. 107–133.
34. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich)
(New York: Bedminister Press, 1968), p. 231; see also, Bratton and van de Walle, op. cit., p. 61.
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patrimonial societies, is exercised on a national scale and in the presence of
an ostensibly impersonal, routinised and rational bureaucratic state. Although
neopatrimonial states display a layer of political formality, whereby some auth-
ority is exercised and regulated through a constitution, codified laws and official
channels, most political power is wielded through pervasive, informal clientelist
networks.35 At the top of these clientelist networks in neopatrimonial states one
finds a president who has gradually usurped power and who dominates the judi-
cial and legislative branches of government.36 A neopatrimonial arrangement of
authority points to pervasive corruption and its attendant negative consequences.
Although counties such as Brazil, China, India and South Korea prove that it is
possible to achieve economic growth and poverty alleviation despite considerable
levels of corruption, few would disagree that corruption in sub-Saharan Africa has
been costly, pervasive and debilitating. In 2006, then Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo estimated that corruption resulted in a $148 billion loss of income for
African countries, a figure roughly six times higher than aid to the continent
at the time or about half of the amount of global aid Pogge would like to see.37
The pervasiveness of corruption is suggested by the failure in 2009 of the
Mo Ibrahim Foundation to identify someone worthy of its annual $5 million
prize for good governance by an African leader.38 The depth and uncontrolled
nature of the rot is suggested by the decay of sub-Saharan Africa’s public
institutions, even though it remains in the interests of the governing elite to main-
tain some of the state’s rational-legal elements, as their self-enrichment and the
patronage and prebends they dispense depend on the state’s ability to extract
resources from society and on upholding the rules that they and their clients
circumvent.
The roots of such state dysfunction can be traced back to the way states were
formed in Africa. In Europe, one of the strongest motivators of the internal devel-
opment of states was the need for political units to fend off potential attacks by
neighbours. Political units that were unable to organise their populations and
extract taxes were overrun and absorbed by more powerful neighbours.39 As a
result, the number of independent political units in Europe was reduced from
35. Clientelism refers to an exchange of favours in a political system between actors with different
levels of power and wealth. Van de Walle distinguishes between two forms of clientelism: patronage
and prebendalism. Patronage refers to the use of state resources to provide jobs and services for politi-
cal supporters, such as hiring someone from one’s ethnic group as a police officer. The doling out of
prebends entails giving individuals public positions and allowing them to benefit from their personal
access to state resources, for example, allowing a police officer to extort motorists at a roadblock.
Prebendalism is the more damaging to the economy. Patronage might lead to inefficient and bloated
government agencies as large numbers of ill-qualified people are employed, but prebendalism
entails the deliberate obstruction of investment and economically productive practices; van de
Walle, op. cit., pp. 19–23.
36. Nicolas van de Walle, “Economic Reform: Patterns and Constraints”, in E. Gyimah-Boadi (ed.),
Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 44–45.
37. BBC, “The Cost of Corruption in Africa”, available: ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4723572.stm. (accessed 18 November 2009).
38. The Guardian, “Mo Ibrahim Prize for African Leadership Will Not be Awarded this Year”,
available: ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/19/mo-ibrahim-african-leadership-prize.
(accessed 18 November 2009).
39. Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organised Crime”, in P.B. Evans,
D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), pp. 169–191.
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roughly 500 in the year 1500 to around 20 in 1900.40 State formation in Africa
did not follow the European path. The presence of colonial powers in Africa
and their agreement at the Berlin Conference in 1885 not to intrude on one
another’s spheres of influence in Africa pre-empted the need for these carved-
up colonial possessions to develop the ability to fend off possible attacks by
their neighbours. The presence of colonial powers also led to the suspension of
indigenous processes of state-formation, limited as these had been in pre-colonial
Africa.41 By the time of decolonisation, former colonies were granted the legal
and normative right to exist as independent states, even though they lacked
some of the essential characteristics of states, such as a monopoly on the legitimate
use of violence on its territory and an ability to govern effectively.42 Instead of
disappearing from the map, as would have happened during the European
state-making era, international society recognised these former colonies as
states. In the terms of Jackson and Rosberg, these former colonies were states in
a “juridical” sense, but not in an “empirical” sense.43 Relatively peaceful relations
among African states continued after the withdrawal of the colonial powers.
Since independence, there have only been a handful of interstate wars in Africa,
none of which resulted in forced changes of national boundaries. More impor-
tantly, at the Organisation of African Unity meeting of 1963, African leaders
declared as illegitimate any attempt to alter the borders that were inherited
from the colonial era, thus reducing the incentive to wage interstate war and to
develop the capacity to defend against external attack.44
The absence of interstate war in Africa, or even the mere threat thereof, meant that
there have been limited opportunities for newly independent states to secure
greater legitimacy, to eliminate internal rivals to their authority, and to tighten
their extractive and bureaucratic hold on their citizenry.45 Additional attempts to
assert internal sovereignty through, for example, nationalist rhetoric, symbolism,
ideology and force achieved only limited success. Upon decolonisation, those in
control of the state were left with the task of asserting the state’s authority over
areas where the “strategies of survival”—”blueprints for action and belief in a
world that hovers on the brink of a Hobbesian state of nature”46—had hitherto
been in the hands of local leaders. The state had to prevail over local leaders in
order to be implement national policies. However, postcolonial African states
encountered considerable resistance from local “strongmen” and ultimately
failed to fully assert their authority over these sub-national nodes of authority
because the unpopularity and disruption to local channels of social control of
seeing through such efforts would have threatened national leaders’ already
fragile grip on power. What emerged was an accommodation: national leaders
came to rely on local strongmen to maintain social order and mobilise the people
40. Charles Tilly, “Reflection on the History of European State-making”, in C. Tilly (ed.), The
Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 24.
41. See Aidan Southall, “State Formation in Africa”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 3 (1974),
pp. 153–165.
42. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and
Juridical in Statehood”, World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1982), p. 6.
43. Ibid.
44. Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa”, International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1990), p. 124.
45. Ibid., pp. 117–139.
46. Joel S. Migdal, Strong States and Weak Societies: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the
Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 27.
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under their authority for specific purposes, while local strongmen received state
resources to strengthen their social control, but whose use of these resources under-
mined the rational-bureaucratic capacity of the state.47 The weak ability of govern-
ing elites in sub-Saharan Africa to assert state control hampered efforts to legitimise
their rule through efficient government and state-led development and instead
resorted to extensive and economically disastrous neopatrimonial strategies to
buy acquiescence and thereby to at least remain in power.48 From the perspective
of African leaders, this has proved to be a remarkably successful strategy, as,
since independence, they have managed to stay in power for almost twice as
long as leaders in Asia and Latin America, despite the venality and economic
ruin that has marked the rule of the vast majority of sub-Saharan governments.49
It has been claimed that the state is essential to lifting large groups of people out
of poverty. However, the dysfunction that characterises the state in sub-Saharan
Africa stems from the colonial era, roots so deep that they are unlikely to be over-
come in the foreseeable future. Pogge, too, points to the colonial origins of much
current poverty and is correct to argue that the “massive grievous wrongs” of this
“single historical process” establish a moral duty on the part of the beneficiaries of
colonialism to compensate the victims.50 My disagreement with Pogge is over the
extent to which the (dysfunctional) state in sub-Saharan Africa will obstruct inter-
national efforts at alleviating poverty on the continent. Herbst, who sees war, or
the threat thereof, as important in the formation and development of states, as
it was in Europe, delivers the dismal assessment that “there is little evidence
that African countries . . . will be able to find peaceful ways to strengthen the
state and develop national identities”.51 While international agencies have been
trying to improve the capacity of states in sub-Saharan Africa through peaceful
means, by, for example, training bureaucrats and even placing skilled foreigners
in key administrative positions, these efforts are unlikely to have much impact
on the pervasiveness of neopatrimonial practices in these regimes, for the incen-
tives that civil servants face have not changed significantly;52 in fact, higher
levels of aid relieve the urgency of making bureaucracies more efficient. Against
such a bleak backdrop we have to consider Pogge’s various proposals to alleviate
global poverty.
The Limits of Compensating Action: Financial Transfers to the Poor
Although Pogge displays some ambivalence about the exact status of financial
transfers to the poor—he sometimes refers to it as assistance, sometimes as
47. Ibid., p. 141.
48. Pierre Englebert, “Pre-colonial Institutions, Post-colonial States, and Economic Development in
Tropical Africa”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2000), p. 12.
49. Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 46.
50. Thomas Pogge, “Priorities of Global Justice”, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 32, No. 1/2 (2001), p. 14.
51. Herbst, op. cit., p. 138.
52. In neopatrimonial societies, the president dominates all branches of government. One impor-
tant way in which the president prevents cabinet ministers from building up independent spheres
of influence is to limit the time they spend in a specific ministerial portfolio. The prudent course of
action for a career official in such an environment is to keep a low profile and not be identified too
closely with the policies of a specific minister who will soon be replaced; Migdal, op. cit., pp. 238–245.
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compensation—he claims that such transfers alone can alleviate global poverty. In
judging Pogge’s claim that one way to eradicate severe global poverty with little
sacrifice on our part is through financial transfers to the poor, two aspects are rel-
evant: the ease with which the money can be raised and whether it can be spent
effectively. This section suggests that the sum of roughly $300 billion that Pogge
would like to raise is not as insignificant as he suggests and, more importantly,
that it will be extremely difficult to spend this money effectively in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Pogge maintains that the income shortfall of the more than 2.7 billion people
living below the World Bank’s $2/day poverty yardstick can be met through the
annual “shifting” of between $230 billion and $320 billion to poor countries.53
This sum would be raised from rich countries meeting their 0.7% of gross national
income (GNI) aid commitments and from Pogge’s proposal for a tax on the use of
global resources (a “global resource dividend”).54 In anticipation of our baulking
at the figure of approximately $300 billion, Pogge points out that it amounts to
only 1.2% of the global product, or, updating some of Pogge’s earlier comparisons,
less than half of the estimated US military budget of $650 billion for 2009.55
Spending this money seems like a small price to pay for eradicating world
hunger and extreme poverty. However, this figure does not look so small when
one considers that it is roughly three times higher than the “exceptionally high”
levels of ODA for 2005 and 2006.56 Pogge’s $300 billion is also much higher
than Sachs’s proposed figure of $195 billion in 2015, which has been criticised
for its “big push” approach to development.57 Pogge further downplays the
opportunity cost of increased aid.58 In 2007, the United States donated $21.8
billion in ODA, or 0.16% of its GNI.59 For the United States to reach the 0.7% of
GNI aid pledge would require an additional $60 billion, an amount higher than
US federal spending on education ($57.5 billion) and roughly double that of
federal spending on “homeland security” ($31.7 billion) during 2007.60
Even though Pogge exaggerates the ease with which the roughly $300 billion
could be raised, he is right that this amount is small if one considers the
amount of good that could be done with it. However, even if such a large sum
were to become available for purposes of development and poverty relief, the
53. Thomas Pogge, “Introduction: Global Justice”, in T.W. Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford: Black-
well, 2001), p. 3; idem, World Poverty, op. cit., pp. 2, 7, 205; idem, “Symposium: World Poverty and Human
Rights”, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2005), p. 1.
54. Idem, World Poverty, op. cit., pp. 196–215.
55. Idem, “Severe Poverty”, op. cit., p. 13; Government of the United States, The President’s 2009
Budget, available: ,http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/defense.pdf. (accessed
27 March 2009). See also Pogge, “Symposium”, op. cit., p. 1; idem, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 205.
56. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Aid Targets Slipping Out of
Reach? (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 1, available: ,http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/25/41724314.pdf.
(accessed 23 March 2009).
57. William Easterly, “The Big Push De´ja` Vu: A Review of Jeffrey Sachs’s The End of Poverty: Econ-
omic Possibilities for Our Time”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2006), pp. 118–127; Jeffrey
Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin, 2005).
58. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 92.
59. OECD, Aid Statistics, Donor Aid Charts: United States, available: ,http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/42/30/41732048.jpg. (accessed 17 April 2009).
60. Government of the United States, The President’s 2009 Budget, available: ,http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/education.pdf. and ,http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/
pdf/budget/dhs.pdf. (accessed 27 March 2009).
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question remains whether it can be put to good use. Pogge recognises the “ineffi-
ciency of conventional development aid” and admits that “it may be true that offi-
cial development assistance has done little for development”.61 These concerns do
not prevent Pogge from claiming that the transfer of approximately $300 billion,
the amount needed to mathematically lift everyone to an income of at least $2
per day, “would make a phenomenal difference to the poor even within a few
years”, if the money were “well targeted and effectively spent”.62
To expect such aid money to be “well targeted and effectively spent” fails to
acknowledge that after more than five decades and more than $2 trillion of aid,63
development economists are still not sure how to best target and spend aid
money, especially not a sum as large as $300 billion.64 What is more, the donor com-
munity itself is not a beacon of efficiency and clarity of purpose.65 Even if one
accepts that there is a general positive link between aid and economic growth at
current levels,66 and not all economists do,67 there is a real danger that the big
push in aid donation and development projects could have damaging effects on
recipient states. Bra¨utigam and Knack have found that in Africa, “higher aid
levels are associated with larger declines in the quality of governance”.68 Specifi-
cally, increased levels of aid might encourage fiscal indiscipline, steer government
accountability away from citizens towards donors, and undermine incentives to
collect tax revenues and build state capacity.69 The latter potential consequence
is particularly worrisome if one regards the state in poor countries as essential to
poverty relief. But, even if we give disregard all these likely negative consequences
of increased aid, Moss and Subramanian report that “even the most optimistic
studies tend to . . . find fairly steep diminishing returns to aid”.70 From a review
of studies on the absorptive capacities of aid-receiving states, Clemens and
Radelet have inferred that the point at which the impact of additional official
61. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 8 and p. 212.
62. Ibid, p. 205; emphasis added.
63. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So
Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 4.
64. See idem, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
65. Nancy Birdsall, Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings, Working Paper No. 50 (Washing-
ton, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004), available: ,http://www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/2737. (accessed 12 December 2008).
66. Michael Clemens, Steven Radelet and Rikhil Bhavnani, Counting Chickens When they Hatch: The
Short-term Effect of Aid on Growth, Working Paper No. 44 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Develop-
ment, 2004), available: ,http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2744. (accessed 12
December 2008).
67. Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian, Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-country Evidence
Really Show?, Working Paper No. 05/127 (Washington, DC: IMF, June 2005), available: ,http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05127.pdf. (accessed 15 January 2009).
68. Deborah A. Bra¨utigam and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2004), p. 266.
69. Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson and Nicolas van de Walle, An Aid–Institutions Paradox? A Review
Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper No. 74 (Washington,
DC: Center for Global Development, 2006), available: ,http://www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/5646. (accessed 15 January 2009).
70. Todd Moss and Arvind Subramanian, After the Big Push? Fiscal and Institutional Implications of
Large Aid Increases, Working Paper No. 71 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005),
p. 7, available: ,http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/4436. (accessed 3 February
2009).
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development assistance (ODA) falls to zero lies between 15% and 45% of GDP.71
The large increase in aid to sub-Saharan Africa that Pogge and also Sachs advocate
would move 24 out of the region’s 35 low-income countries into the aforemen-
tioned range where aid ceases to have any further positive effect on economic
growth.72 In short, serious doubts remain about how to spend a drastically
increased amount of aid, whether it will have much effect and whether it may
even cause damage in recipient countries, all of which suggest that Pogge’s
strategy of greatly increasing aid to poor countries might not have the poverty-
ending consequences he envisions.
There is much agreement that the institutional quality of the recipient country is
a principal determinant of whether aid will be effective.73 The previous section
painted a dismal picture of governing elites in sub-Saharan Africa as restricted
in their ability to strengthen the state’s hold on society and as having had to
resort to neopatrimonial practices to maintain themselves in power, with disas-
trous consequences for state capacity and the national economy. One way to
push African governments to improve their governance is through aid condition-
ality, a strategy that Pogge supports.74 However, aid conditionality has proved dif-
ficult to impose. The ability of donors to use aid conditionality to put pressure on
recipient governments is being undermined by a lack of donor coordination,
mounting pressure on donor governments to increase foreign aid, and the rising
aid levels of recent years. The willingness of Western donors to overlook bad gov-
ernance when the aid-receiving country is of strategic importance has long
worked against conditionality, a problem that has been exacerbated by China’s
increased involvement in Africa. In 1998, China provided a mere $107 million
in aid to Africa. By 2004, this figure had jumped to $2.7 billion.75 China is also
on the cusp of becoming of Africa’s largest trading partner.76 China’s growing
role in Africa is motivated by a number of factors, such as building a coalition
of developing countries, convincing African countries to recognise it rather than
Taiwan as the true China, developing markets for its goods and securing its
food supplies by buying up tracts of farm land. However, for China, securing
access to Africa’s natural resources is probably the weightiest consideration of
all. China has consequently focused its aid, concessionary loans and investments
on the most resource-rich countries on the continent, such as oil producers like
Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Chad and mineral-rich countries like Zambia and
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although some good has come from
China’s economic involvement in Africa, China’s refusal to demand good govern-
ance in exchange for financial assistance and investment has undermined the
ability of the World Bank and the IMF to use aid conditionality to bring about
71. Michael Clemens and Steven Radelet, The Millennium Challenge Account: How Much is too Much,
How Long is Long Enough?, Working Paper No. 23 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development,
2003), p. 7, available ,http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2767. (accessed 2 March
2009).
72. Moss and Subramanian, op. cit., p. 6.
73. For example, Burnside and Dollar, op. cit.; Radelet, op. cit.
74. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 206.
75. Joshua Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Safari: China’s Move into Africa and its Implications for Aid, Develop-
ment, and Governance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), available:
,http://carnegieendowment.org/files/kurlantzick_outlook_africa2.pdf. (accessed 15 February
2009).
76. Chris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007), p. 2.
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better governance. When pushed on the matter, Chinese officials coyly invoke the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.
Two of the best examples of how Chinese interference allowed venal govern-
ments to escape donor demands for better governance occurred in Angola and
Chad. Between 1997 and 2002, $4 billion disappeared from Angola’s public
coffers.77 However, in 2005, China helped Angola evade IMF demands for
greater accountability by extending a $2 billion loan to Angola and winning for
its oil company Sinopec leasing rights to an Angolan oilfield. China has provided
at least $5 billion in loans to Angola in recent years, although the World Bank esti-
mates that China has provided the country with a further $8 billion in unreported
loans. Chad is a land-locked country and one of the poorest on earth. In 2000, the
World Bank agreed to help finance an oil pipeline from Chad to the Cameroonian
coast, on the condition that 70% of the proceeds of the project must be used for
poverty reduction. However, in 2006, Chad switched its recognition from
Taiwan to mainland China and Chinese investment in oil production began to
pour in. Having lost its leverage over the Chadian government, the World Bank
withdrew from the project in 2008, citing the government’s repeated reneging on
poverty-fighting spending commitments.78 China’s hunger for natural resources,
its view of itself as a major power and its growing global clout mean that China
is unlikely to change tack in Africa or to let itself be reined in.
Beyond the difficulty of bringing aid conditionality to bear, even the World Bank
acknowledges that it has produced “mixed” results when it has been imposed.79
Van de Walle reports that attaching greater strings to development aid has not led
to a more appropriate use of public money or the rehabilitation of state institutions
in sub-Saharan Africa, nor has it led to a reform of the continent’s neopatrimonial
regimes. The intransigence of neopatrimonial regimes is hardly surprising if one
considers that they have little incentive to improve the national institutional
environment, because improved state capacity would inhibit rent-seeking and
clientelism, which would in turn threaten their hold on power and frequently
a source of significant personal income.80 When faced with tougher conditions
and more restricted access to development aid, state elites have concentrated
“their increasingly limited resources on the key issue for them, maintaining the
unity of the political class . . . rather than invest in mundane activities like building
schools or undertaking vaccine campaigns, particularly given the donor predilec-
tion for such thankless tasks”.81 On this reading, stricter aid conditions have thus
also had counterproductive consequences, such as a withdrawal of the state from
development tasks.
77. Kenneth Roth, China’s Silence Boosts Tyrants (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006), available:
,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/04/18/chinas-silence-boosts-tyrants. (accessed 13 February
2009).
78. Alden, op. cit.; Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working (New York:
Palgrave, 2006), pp. 177–194; Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, “China, Filling a Void, Drills for
Riches in Chad”, New York Times (13 August 2007), available: ,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/
world/africa/13chinaafrica.html?fta¼y&pagewanted¼all. (accessed 15 February 2009); Kurlantzick,
op. cit.
79. Stefan Koeberle, “Conditionality: Under What Conditions?”, in S. Koeberle et al. (eds.), Condi-
tionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 57–83.
80. Van de Walle, Overcoming Stagnation, op. cit., p. 35.
81. Van de Walle, African Economies, op. cit., p. 164.
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Raising around $300 billion for transfer to poor countries will not be as easy or
painless as Pogge’s suggests. But even if this amount is raised, it is not clear that it
can be spent in a way that would eradicate severe poverty. The fundamental
problem with Pogge’s plan is that aid is more effective in a good institutional
environment, a rare exception in sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts to induce better gov-
ernance on the part of aid recipients face a myriad of problems, some of which
stem from power struggles among major powers, a tussle in which sub-Saharan
Africa has (again) become a pawn. Nevertheless, the limits of increased aid and
aid conditionality do not exhaust Pogge’s proposals to eradicate global poverty.
Pogge also argues that international institutional reforms will lead to an eradica-
tion of most severe global poverty.
The Limits of Compensating Action: International Institutional Reforms
The second broad way in which we are to compensate for participating in global
institutions that have unjust and unnecessarily harmful distributive consequences
is to work for their reform. Pogge’s focus on institutions is particularly necessary
because much distributive injustice is systemic, that is, the injustice cannot be
traced back to obvious or deliberately unjust actions by us, but stems from the
cumulative effects of our mostly mundane actions and interactions, which also
means that “[i]t is quite infeasible for us to adjust our conduct so as to avoid
such effects”.82 However, adjustments to the global institutional framework
make it possible to shape the cumulative consequences of our interaction
towards an outcome that is less damaging to the world’s poorest people. Pogge
requires that we make “reasonable efforts” to bring about such reform.83 As
with the success that Pogge predicts would stem from the transfer of roughly
$300 billion, Pogge claims that “[m]inor redesigns of a few critical features [of
the global institutional order] would suffice to avoid most of the severe poverty
we are witnessing today”.84 Components of the global institutional order ident-
ified for “minor” redesign include a fairer trade arrangement that would see
rich countries scrap protectionist barriers against competing goods from poor
countries, such as clothing and agricultural products; securing better governance
in poor countries by making it harder for unconstitutional governments to borrow
money internationally or to sell off public resources for personal gain; and assist-
ing the democratisation process in poor countries.85
Pogge’s claim that the international trade order is deeply biased against the
poorest countries is not in dispute. For the sake of minor material gains, rich
countries impose onerous conditions on poor countries, while at the same time
82. Pogge, Realizing Rawls, op. cit., p. 12.
83. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 170.
84. Pogge, “Reply to the Critics”, op. cit., p. 59.
85. One important omission is Pogge’s recent important work on making essential medication more
affordable for the poor and directing more research to address the needs of people who lack the ability
to pay for such medication. Pogge’s proposals are detailed and wide ranging, dealing with issues that
cannot be adequately addressed in a few paragraphs with patent rights, and thus better suited to more
extensive analysis than can be undertaken in this article; Thomas Pogge, “Human Rights and Global
Health: A Research Program”, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 36, No. 1/2 (2005), pp. 182–209; Aidan Hollis and
Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All (New Haven: Incentives
for Global Health, 2008).
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shielding their own markets and subsidising some of their exports.86 Neverthe-
less, Pogge is very optimistic about the poverty-alleviating potential of trade, pro-
vided that the rules of global trade are changed to better accommodate the
interests of the poor. Pogge bases his hopefulness about international trade on a
1999 study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD),87 which predicted that developing countries would have been able
to export $700 billion more by 2005, had rich countries done more to open their
markets.88 In a more recent publication, Pogge repeats the figure of $700 billion in
lost export opportunities.89
The extent of global institutional reform is constrained by Pogge’s requirement
that proposed reforms should be minor, to which Pogge attaches two interrelated
senses: firstly, reforms are mere adjustments to current institutions, rather
than their “revolutionary overthrow”,90 and secondly, the consequences of
these reforms should have minimal impact on citizens of well-off countries (in
order to secure their support). This is especially significant if one considers that
the most recent round of WTO negotiations, the Doha Development Round, has
been stalling since 2001. On the face of it, the continued failure of the Doha
Round can be attributed to unresolved disagreements over rich-country agricul-
tural subsidies and protectionism. However, deeper factors such as the growing
number of WTO members and the declining ability of the United States to
provide hegemonic leadership make future agreements even less likely. Taking
into account the difficulty of reaching agreement in the Doha Round, World
Bank economists have calculated the consequences of a number of possible agree-
ments, arranged according to the extent of concessions granted to poor countries.
The authors of this study predict that gains from a future global trade agreement
that offered the most favourable deal to the developing world91 will result in
low-income countries gaining only $3.6 billion and in the lifting of only 2.5
million additional people to above the $1/day mark by 2015 than if no trade
liberalisation is undertaken.92 A few studies have even found that the most
likely outcome of the Doha Round will lead to a slight loss of income for sub-
Saharan Africa.93 Such dire forecasts should be tempered by studies that make
more optimistic predictions. Cline foresees that trade liberalisation could lift
86. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 19.
87. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade and Development
Report 1999 (New York: UN Publications, 1999).
88. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 18.
89. Pogge, “Severe Poverty”, op. cit., p. 37.
90. Pogge, “Reply to the Critics”, op. cit., p. 59.
91. Defined as an elimination of agricultural export subsidies by all countries, cuts in domestic agri-
cultural subsidies by developed countries, no cuts in domestic support by least-developed countries,
cuts of 45–75% in agricultural tariffs for developed countries (35–60% for developing countries) and
50% in non-agricultural tariffs by developed countries (33% for developing countries); Kym Anderson,
Will Martin, and Dominique van der Mensbrugge, “Market and Welfare Implications of Doha Reform
Scenarios”, in K. Anderson and W. Martin (eds.), Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development
Agenda (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), pp. 333–399.
92. Ibid.
93. Antoine Boue¨t et al., “Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: The Contrasting Fortunes
of Developing Countries in the Doha Round”, World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 9 (2005), p. 1346; T.J. Achter-
bosch et al., Trade Liberalisation under the Doha Development Agenda: Options and Consequences for Africa
(The Hague: Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2004), p. 50, available: ,http://129.3.20.41/
eps/it/papers/0407/0407013.pdf. (accessed 15 February 2009).
246 Eduard Jordaan
between 440 and 590 million people out of poverty by 2015,94 while Oxfam has
calculated that if sub-Saharan Africa expanded its share of the global export
market from the current 1% to 2% it would increase its annual exchange earnings
by $70 billion.95 Although the likely consequences of a possible agreement in the
Doha Round remain in dispute, one should bear in mind that most African
countries are net food importers and thus likely to face higher prices when rich
countries reduce their agricultural export subsidies. Furthermore, most African
agricultural producers are not globally competitive and therefore likely to lose
out to stronger competition, a loss of market share that would be exacerbated
when the preferential access to Western markets that many African exporters
enjoy under the Generalised System of Preferences is swallowed up by broader
agricultural liberalisation.96 The implication of all of this is that although rich
countries have imposed an international trading order on poor countries that
makes it difficult for them to move out of poverty, changes to the rules of inter-
national trade (within the realm of the possible) might not do much to improve
poverty levels, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
Pogge acknowledges the poverty-causing consequences of depraved national
leadership, but sticks with his argument that reforms at the international level
can eradicate poverty. He presents us with a number of international-level initiat-
ives aimed at improving governance in poor countries, particularly when rulers
are mostly interested in enriching themselves. Two of Pogge’s proposals stand
out: restricting the ability of unconstitutional governments to borrow internation-
ally and preventing the ability of ruling elites to gain privately from selling off
their country’s natural resources to international corporations. Pogge character-
ises the resource and borrowing privileges as “two aspects of the global economic
order, imposed by the wealthy societies and cherished also by authoritarian rulers
and corrupt elites in poorer countries”.97 This is a mischaracterisation, for these
two privileges are manifestations of the principle of national sovereignty. While
resource and borrowing privileges have no necessary link to the principle of
national sovereignty, and although the Westphalian state system is being eroded
by ideas and material forces,98 aspects of national sovereignty are generally
harder to change than the rules of the global economic order. Pogge’s casting of
the resource and borrowing privileges of unconstitutional governments as mere
rules of the global economic order imposed by affluent societies is intended to
suggest that these are relatively easy to change and in keeping with his general
argument that it would be relatively easy to effect change to international insti-
tutions so as to eradicate global poverty. That said, Pogge’s arguments about
94. William R. Cline, Trade Policy and Global Poverty (Washington, DC: Center for Global Develop-
ment, 2004), p. 282.
95. Jennifer Brant, Africa and the Doha Round: Fighting to Keep Development Alive (Washington, DC:
Oxfam, 2005), p. 8; available: ,http://www.oxfam.de/download/Africa_and_the_Doha_Round.
pdf. (accessed 16 February 2009).
96. Mareike Meyn, The WTO Doha Round Impasse: Implications for Africa (London: Overseas Devel-
opment Institute, September, 2008), p. 3; available: ,http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/odi-
publications/briefing-papers/41-wto-doha-round-impasse-implications-for-africa.pdf. (accessed 15
February 2009).
97. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 115.
98. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance
(Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern Inter-
national Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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the problematic consequences of the current global order might have a more
indirect impact, for, as Philpott has argued, changes in sovereignty stem from
preceding changes in our notions of justice and political authority.99
Regarding the international borrowing privilege, Pogge argues for restricting
the ability of unconstitutional governments to borrow internationally and
siphon off the money to their own accounts, thereby saddling the country and
future governments with the debt. The international borrowing privilege creates
an incentive to grab power through a coup d’e´tat and also undermines the sub-
sequent democratic government by leaving it with a national debt that limits its
ability to pursue much-needed social spending. Although Pogge has argued for
greater restrictions on the ability of unconstitutional governments to borrow inter-
nationally as recently as 2007, developments such as a decline in see-no-evil
lending since the end of the Cold War, large-scale debt forgiveness since 1996
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, the spread of democ-
racy across Africa, and closer monitoring of poor-country borrowing by organis-
ations such as the IMF mean that Pogge’s proposal is in effect already in the
process of being implemented. While these changes are evidence of what Pogge
would cite as relatively easy-to-achieve reforms, it should be noted that democ-
racy in sub-Saharan Africa recently experienced “substantial” reversals, while
Moss has argued that debt relief is “unlikely to have a meaningful effect on
either government finances or on poverty reduction anytime soon”.100
Pogge’s proposal to restrict the ability of public officials to sell off natural
resources to foreigners for bribes, commissions or a personal share of the proceeds
is more relevant. An economic orthodoxy that encourages poor countries to court
foreign investors and to privatise economic activity increases opportunities for
this type of malpractice. To combat this problem, Pogge has proposed “an inter-
national treaty that rulers who hold power contrary to their country’s constitution
and without democratic legitimation cannot sell their country’s resources abroad
nor borrow in its name”.101 One implication of such a treaty is that OECD
countries would willingly stop importing oil from Angola, Sudan, the Middle
East and Central Asia. Pogge is on a more realistic path when he argues that
Western companies that extract resources in poor countries should be held in
check through legislation in their countries of origin, for the legal systems in
poor countries are too weak to hold these companies to account. As Pogge
notes, affluent countries have already taken steps to curtail corrupt practices by
their nationals on foreign soil, although banks and multinational corporations
continue to evade these new strictures.102 The continued dealings of Western oil
companies with the corrupt Nigerian government, the cabal in charge of Equator-
ial Guinea or the oppressive Saudi regime substantiate Pogge’s scepticism. Never-
theless, legislation in Western countries has limited the ability of their companies
to bribe foreign officials, as Pogge acknowledges.103 However, the gains made in
99. Philpott, op. cit., p. 4.
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recent years are being eroded by China’s rise as an economic power. Whereas
Western companies are increasingly constrained by anti-bribery legislation in
their home countries, Chinese companies investing in Africa face no such restric-
tions from their government (most of these Chinese companies are state owned, in
any case). In fact, in order to gain access to markets and secure a steady supply of
oil and other natural resources, the Chinese government has shown itself more
than willing to support Chinese companies through diplomacy, subsidies and
loans.104 This leads to pressure to get rid of anti-bribery legislation in the West,
as well of labour and environmental standards, since Western companies are
losing out to their Chinese competitors.105
Since abuse of their international borrowing and resource privileges is a sin
committed by “unconstitutional” governments, Pogge sees support for democra-
tisation as a fundamental way of improving economic governance and directing
more resources to the poor. Greater democratic accountability would presumably
lead to improved economic governance and have desirable redistributive conse-
quences as the large numbers of poor people use their votes to sway distributive
policies in their favour. In support of the democratisation process in developing
countries, Pogge suggests that newly democratic countries should adopt a consti-
tutional amendment that debts incurred by future governments that govern or
assume power in an undemocratic fashion should not be repaid out of the
public purse. To settle disagreements over whether a government is undemocratic
or whether it assumed power in a flawed election, Pogge recommends that such
new democracies should “empower some external agency to settle such contro-
versies quickly and authoritatively in the manner of a court”.106
While an increasing number of African countries are holding elections of
passable quality, democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has shown itself to be little
more than a more palatable form of elite competition for control of the state and
its resources.107 This is borne out by van de Walle’s analysis of the political
parties and party systems that have developed since the 1990s when many
African countries joined the third wave of democratisation. Van de Walle’s prin-
cipal findings are consistent with claims he made elsewhere about the tenacity
of neopatrimonial governance in sub-Saharan Africa and which were discussed
above.108 The outcomes of transition elections in Africa have proved to be of
crucial importance, for, once in power, the incumbents have used their control
of state resources to consolidate power and centre it on the president. Moreover,
democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa has yielded a party system in which one
party holds a majority of seats and is surrounded by “an excessive number” of
small parliamentary parties. These small parties show little interest in forming a
larger opposition party with the potential of winning a future election. Rather,
by remaining small, they increase their chances of being co-opted by the dominant
party.109
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There can be little doubt that Pogge’s various proposals for global institutional
reform will reduce poverty in the developing world. However, to claim that minor
redesign will move the roughly 2.5 billion people who live on less than $2 a day to
above this line is strongly exaggerated.110 To be fair, Pogge makes a few other pro-
posals and it is also possible to think of additional institutional reforms. However,
as has been argued, some causes of poverty are local and so tenacious that they are
unlikely to be solved through international action alone.
Three Options
This article disputes Pogge’s claim that the most severe poverty can be eradicated
through international-level actions that would cause us little inconvenience.
Pogge tends to overestimate the ease with which certain international reforms
can be achieved, but, more importantly, overestimates the impact of these
reforms on poverty levels (which is not to deny that Pogge’s proposals would
lead to some reduction in global poverty). Through reference to sub-Saharan
Africa, it is argued that the local institutional environment through which inter-
national-level reforms would have to pass is so toxic that these efforts would
fail to have their full intended effect. The source of the dysfunctional governance
that characterises sub-Saharan Africa lies in the way states on the continent were
formed and therefore cannot be changed easily. If the assessment that Pogge’s cos-
mopolitanism is faced with a gap between what international-level reforms are
able to accomplish and what they aim to accomplish is correct, Pogge seems to
be left with (a combination of) three options: one, settle for a more modest
reduction of global poverty; two, expect greater endeavour from the poor and
their governments in lifting themselves out of poverty; or (and) three, demand
a deeper sacrifice and involvement on our part in eradicating global poverty.
One can safely say that Pogge would have little patience for the first option. In a
discussion of the agreement to halve the number of undernourished people by
2015, reached at the 1996 World Food Summit, one can sense Pogge biting his
lip as he writes:
Our governments’ plan envisages that, even in 2015, there will still be 420
million undernourished human beings and, assuming rough proportion-
ality, 9 million annual poverty deaths. Are these levels we can condone?
With a linear decline, implying a 474 000 annual reduction in the
number of deaths, the plan envisages 250 million deaths from poverty-
related causes over the 19-year plan period. Is so huge a death toll accep-
table because these deaths would be occurring at a declining rate?111
Pogge’s second option entails demanding more from the poor and their govern-
ments. Pogge recognises the poverty-causing consequences of venal governance,
but maintains that solving global poverty can be a matter of either creating just
international institutions or creating just national institutions.112 While Pogge
puts blame on the leaders of the worst-governed, resource-rich countries—e.g.
110. Pogge, “Reply to the Critics”, op. cit., p. 59.
111. Pogge, World Poverty, op. cit., p. 10.
112. Pogge, “Severe Poverty”, op. cit., p. 46.
250 Eduard Jordaan
Mobotu Sese Seko, Sani Abacha—he never calls into question the public culture
and therefore the role played by ordinary citizens in sustaining the disastrous gov-
ernance that has plagued the vast majority of sub-Saharan countries, which do not
all have an abundance of natural resources (and are therefore less vulnerable to
bribe-paying foreign companies, according to Pogge’s logic). Furthermore,
much corruption is run of the mill and has little, if any, connection to the global
institutional order or foreign investors. It was argued above that the neopatrimo-
nial governance one finds throughout sub-Saharan Africa has been a response to
the constraints on state-building on the continent, yet many argue that such
practices are typical of more traditional societies. Indeed, Christopher Clapham
has argued that in these societies, clientelistic practices are “accepted as normal
behavior, condemned only in so far as it benefits someone else rather than
oneself”.113 While using one’s position as a civil servant to benefit one’s relatives
and community at the expense of the state might be in adherence to the norms
prevalent in African societies—which reportedly place a relatively strong empha-
sis on loyalty to one’s family and community—such behaviour has obvious nega-
tive consequences for state capacity and the national economy when it becomes
common practice. The case of Botswana does further damage to Pogge’s argument
that international-level actions alone can eradicate most national poverty. Bots-
wana is a democratic, well-governed country whose economy grew by an
average of 9% between 1967 and 2006 and has a GDP per capita of around
$13,900. Impressive as this may sound, the country’s Gini-coefficient is above 60
and almost half of the population lives on less than $2/day.114 There is very
little that the international community can do to ensure justice for the poor half
of Botswana’s population. The problem for Pogge is that once he starts separating
and accepting the role of a national political culture in perpetuating national
poverty, independent of the international institutional environment, he would
be practising the “explanatory nationalism” of which he has been so critical.
However, in so far as an end to global poverty is Pogge’s primary goal, I think
he has little choice but to recognise that much poverty is due to local institutions
and distributional patterns that are not determined by the international economic
order.
Pogge’s third option is to require more effort and sacrifice from us. However,
Pogge is resistant to positive duties and to reforms that are too demanding, requir-
ing only that we make a reasonable effort, which he measures “as much of an effort,
aimed at protecting the victims of injustice or at institutional reform, as would
suffice to eradicate the harms, if others followed suit”.115 As it was argued
above that an increase in aid will have limited effect, one is left with the option
of international institutional reform. Although Pogge’s proposed institutional
reforms will certainly reduce global poverty, deeper reforms—reforms that
would most likely cause “inconvenience” to citizens of well-off countries—
would be needed, especially since not everyone can be counted on to even
make a “reasonable effort”. As an example of such reform, one could cite Stiglitz’s
proposal for trade reciprocity among equals, which means that rich countries
should open their markets to all other countries, middle-income countries
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should open their markets to other middle-income countries as well as to poor
countries, but not to rich countries, while poor countries should open their
markets only to other poor countries, while enjoying unreciprocated access to
the markets of rich and middle-income countries.116
Pogge’s three options correspond to those that face moral cosmopolitans more
generally. Cosmopolitan debates of the present have emerged from and carry
forward deep disquiet about the extent of global poverty and inequality. This
concern is visible in the writing of those who were at the forefront of contempor-
ary cosmopolitan thought—for example, Peter Singer, Onara O’Neill, Brian Barry,
Charles Beitz and Henry Shue—and remains visible in the vast number of publi-
cations by cosmopolitans in recent years. The short of it is that moral cosmopoli-
tanism cannot be reconciled with poverty-related suffering and the death of
people in other countries. Against the second option of locating more responsibil-
ity for ending poverty with the poor and their governments, cosmopolitans have
consistently emphasised the international causes of local poverty and therefore
international responsibility for solving this problem. Cosmopolitans are most
likely to adopt the third option: deeper sacrifice on the part of the well-off.
However, even though cosmopolitanism is marked by considerable generosity
towards the poor, it has always been concerned to place a limit on what is
owed to the poor.117
If the socio-political environment in sub-Saharan Africa is as resistant to inter-
national efforts at poverty alleviation as has been suggested and if Pogge’s inter-
national institutional reforms are both harder to implement and unlikely to have
as much impact as he thinks, then the solution to global poverty seems to lie in a
combination of the second and third options: more sacrifice and effort from the
leaders and citizens of poor countries as well as from us living in better-off
countries. Such a conclusion differs from Pogge’s cosmopolitanism by demanding
more from the poor as well as deeper sacrifice and endeavour from the better-off.
The suggestion that both the rich and the poor should do their part in solving
global poverty is not unusual in debates about global justice. Indeed, the fact
that attempts to frame philosophical discussion over where to locate responsibility
for solving the problem of global poverty as the “cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate” never caught on suggests that few ever thought responsibility for
ending global poverty should be the responsibility of either rich or poor countries.
Indeed, one of the first authors to delineate the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate, Chris Brown, quickly denounced this categorisation as too simplistic.118
David Miller relies on the notion of “national responsibility” to locate duties to
end global poverty with both rich and poor countries.119 With relevance to the
badly governed countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Miller argues that “where
nations act in ways that impose burdens on themselves . . . responsibility for
such burdens falls on every member, even those who opposed the decisions
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and policies in question”.120 Regarding well-off countries, Miller argues that the
best path to global justice would be to persuade people that they have a national
responsibility to make certain sacrifices, based on their capacity to do so, past
wrongs they have committed, and so on.121 Although Miller is critical of
Pogge’s enterprise, he argues that remedial action flowing from our national
responsibility includes reforming the international order to open pathways that
would lead poor countries out of poverty, should they so choose.122
However, there is a danger in Miller’s position, one that he recognises, and it
concerns invoking national values to obstruct remedial responsibility towards
the poor.123 Pogge’s arguments about a history of colonial exploitation and our
imposition of an unnecessarily harmful international institutional order constitute
a preferable way of arguing that we have duties to citizens of poor countries. This
is because Pogge’s arguments leave very little room to wriggle free from the com-
pensatory duties that derive from our complicity in the unjustness of the inter-
national order. But as much as rich countries and their citizens are to blame for
creating and benefiting from an international order that pins millions of people
in severe poverty, and even if the rich were fully to blame, global poverty
cannot be solved without the additional requirement that people in poor countries
insist on clean governance and themselves behave in ways that break neopatrimo-
nial linkages.
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